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Business Associations
by Paul A. Quir6s*
Lynn S. Scott**
and
George Ward Hendon, Jr.***
This Article surveys recent developments in Georgia's corporate,
securities, partnership, and banking law. It covers noteworthy cases
decided during the survey period' by the Georgia appellate courts,
United States district courts located in Georgia, and the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. Also included in this Article are highlights of recent
revisions to the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.").
I.

CORPORATIONS

A.

Piercingthe CorporateVeil
Georgia courts may permit "piercing the corporate veil" to hold
individual shareholders, officers, or agents liable for corporate debts
when those individuals have so disregarded the corporate structure that
allowing the corporate veil to shield them from liability would create an
injustice or perpetuate a fraud. A corporation is a legal entity separate
from its shareholders, officers, and agents, which effectively shields the
assets of these individuals from the liabilities of the corporation. In
essence, the owners and managers of a corporation act as mere agents
* Partner in the firm of King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia. Furman University (B.A.,
1979); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 1982). Member, Mercer
Law Review (1980-1982); Lead Articles II Editor (1981-1982). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia
(B.S., 1971); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 1988). Member,
Mercer Law Review (1986-1988); Research Editor (1987-1988). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia. University of North
Carolina (B.A., 1992; J.D., 1996). Member, State Bars of North Carolina and Georgia.
1. The survey period is June 1, 1998, through May 31, 1999.
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on behalf of the corporation. However, the courts have been increasingly
willing to look beyond form and at substance in determining whether the
corporate entity and attendant liability shield for its owners has been so
abused that the only way to avoid injustice is to hold the agents of the
corporation liable for its debts.2 For example, Georgia courts have
pierced the corporate veil in cases in which the corporation's agents have
commingled corporate funds with personal funds or among related
corporate entities and accounts.3
In spite of a wealth of case law addressing veil-piercing claims, the
Georgia courts have not woven a consistent thread of cases applying the
various veil-piercing theories to disparate factual situations. The courts
have used a variety of theories to justify piercing the corporate veil,
including alter ego, apparent or ostensible agency, fraud, abuse, and
joint venturer.' As a result, appellate review appears confused, and
consequently, the parties involved in such cases do not have a consistent
guide in the case law to reasonably predict the outcome of these claims.5
Courts generally frame the issue of piercing the corporate veil as
whether the corporation is the alter ego or business conduit of the
shareholders.6 The main inquiry is not the composition of corporate
ownership or control because, under Georgia law, a corporation and its
shareholders or officers are separate entities even if wholly-owned and
controlled by a sole shareholder.' To state a claim to pierce the
corporate veil in Georgia, the plaintiff must show the following: (1) that
the shareholder's disregard of the corporate entity made it a mere
instrumentality for the transaction of the shareholder's own affairs; (2)
that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporate form and the shareholder or officer cease
to exist; and (3) that to adhere to the doctrine of a separate corporate

2. See generally JEROME L. KAPLAN ET AL.,KAPLAN'S NADLER, GEORGIA CORPORATIONS,
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 3-14 (1999).

3. In re Adventure Bound Sports, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 1244, 1256 (S.D. Ga. 1993).
4. See, e.g., Kissun v. Humana, Inc., 267 Ga. 419, 419-21, 479 S.E.2d 751, 752-53
(1997).
5. See Paul A. Quir6s & Gregory M. Beil, Business Associations, 47 MERCER L. REV. 41,
42-48 (1995); Paul A. Quir6s & Lynn Scott Magruder, Business Associations, 43 MERCER
L. REV. 85, 86-94 (1991).
6. See, e.g., Hickman v. Hyzer, 261 Ga. 38, 39, 401 S.E.2d 738, 739 (1991); Mark Six
Realty Assocs. Inc. v. Drake, 219 Ga. App. 57, 61, 463 S.E.2d 917, 921 (1995); J & J
Materials, Inc. v. Conyers Seafood Co., 214 Ga. App. 63, 64, 446 S.E.2d 781, 782 (1994);
Derbyshire v. United Builders Supplies, Inc., 194 Ga. App. 840, 844, 392 S.E.2d 37, 40
(1990); Amason v. Whitehead, 186 Ga. App. 320, 321, 367 S.E.2d 107, 108 (1988).
7. International Telecomms. Exch. Corp. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1520,
1551-52 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (citing United States v. Fidelity Capital Corp., 920 F.2d 827, 837
(11th Cir. 1991)).
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entity would promote injustice or protect fraud.' To submit the issue
to a jury, courts require evidence that the corporate arrangement is a
sham used "'to defeat justice, to perpetrate a fraud, or to evade
statutory, contractual or tort responsibility."' 9
1. Georgia Court of Appeals Pierces the Corporate Veil of
Closely-Held Corporations to Hold Officers Liable for Corporate
Debts When Closely-Held Corporations Were Stripped of Assets
to Avoid Liability. In Speir v. Krieger,"° plaintiff filed suit against
McFrugal Auto Rental, Inc. ("McFrugal") after a car rented from
McFrugal ran into plaintiff's vehicle, causing injuries to plaintiff.
Plaintiff subsequently discovered that, contrary to state law, McFrugal
did not carry third-party liability insurance on its rental vehicles even
though McFrugal sold such insurance to its customers. On December 18,
1995, the trial court awarded plaintiff $7248 in compensatory damages
and $250,000 in punitive damages on a fraud claim. Prior to the verdict,
McFrugal's Chief Executive Officer and one of its two shareholders,
Roveto, sold the assets of McFrugal and another related closely-held
entity, McFrugal Holding Company ("McFrugal Holding"), to a new
corporation, McRent-A-Car, Inc. ("McRent"). McRent was formed for the
purpose of acquiring the assets of the two closely-held corporations
(together, "McFrugal Companies"). This transaction left the McFrugal
Companies insolvent.11
After receiving the verdict, plaintiff filed suit in equity against the
McFrugal Companies seeking to pierce the corporate veil between the
entities and to hold their shareholders liable on the ground that Roveto
commingled the assets between the entities to avoid payment of the
judgment. On January 22, 1997, the trial court entered a judgment
holding the McFrugal Companies liable for the earlier verdict. Plaintiff
then filed another suit in equity against the two corporate officers of the
McFrugal Companies, Speir and Roveto, to hold them personally liable
for the outstanding judgment. The parties filed cross-motions for
of material
summary judgment, and the trial court, finding no issues
12
fact, granted plaintiff's motion. Only Speir appealed.

8. See cases cited supra notes 6-7.
9. Hickman, 261 Ga. at 39, 401 S.E.2d at 740 (quoting Jerome L. Kaplan, Kaplan's
Nadler, Georgia CorporationLaw § 3-14 (1988); see also J & J Materials,214 Ga. App. at
65, 446 S.E.2d at 783; Derbyshire, 194 Ga. App. at 844, 392 S.E.2d at 40; Amason, 186 Ga.
App. at 321, 367 S.E.2d at 108.
10. 235 Ga. App. 392, 509 S.E.2d 684 (1998).
11. Id. at 393, 509 S.E.2d at 686.
12. Id. at 393-94, 509 S.E.2d at 686-87.
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On appeal Speir contended that the trial court's ruling only pierced
the corporate veil between McFrugal and McFrugal Holding and,
therefore, created a single entity from which plaintiff must seek
recovery. 3 The court of appeals disagreed, stating that "[t]he improper
commingling of two independent corporations so as to render them 'one
entity' does not create a separate corporation entirely liable for plaintiff's
damages and conveniently shielding the operation officers therefrom." 4
Furthermore, the court noted, "[i]t does not follow that operating two
separate corporations illegally creates one legal corporation." 5 To
agree with plaintiff's logic would force the court to support the notion
that Speir and Roveto could, in effect, illegally commingle the assets of
McFrugal and McFrugal Holding to avoid a judgment creditor, then strip
the assets out of those corporations and shield those assets by organizing
a new corporation. 6 This provided an example of corporate form
taking precedence over substance, and, as a result, the7 court upheld the
judgment against the insolvent corporations' officers.'
Speir also contended that, even if the McFrugal Companies' corporate
officers could be held personally liable, he was not a corporate officer
during the time of the alleged misuse of the corporate form. Speir, who
held the positions of corporate secretary and registered agent, claimed
that he resigned from his official duties with the McFrugal Companies
at a board of directors meeting in December 1994 and submitted an
affidavit to that effect. Plaintiff countered with certified copies of the
corporate registry for the McFrugal Companies."
The corporate
registry is filed with the Secretary of State and is required to be updated
annually; 19 the failure to notify the Secretary of State within sixty days
that a corporation's registered agent has resigned subjects the corporation to administrative dissolution.2" The certified documents submitted
by plaintiff indicated that, as of September 11, 1996, Speir was still
registered as the corporate secretary and registered agent of McFru21
gal.
Finally, Speir argued that he was not a party to the previous lawsuits
between plaintiff and the McFrugal Companies, and, therefore, the prior
judgments could not be enforced against him. Speir asserted that no

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 394, 509 S.E.2d at 687.
Id. at 397, 509 S.E.2d at 689.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1622 (Supp. 1999).
See id. § 14-2-1420(4) (1994).
235 Ga. App. at 398, 509 S.E.2d at 689.
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evidence in the record demonstrated that he directly participated in any
of the illegal activities. 22 Rejecting this argument, the court distinguished the rule in Cherry v. Ward,23 which was the principal case that
Speir relied upon.24 Cherry stands for the proposition that
"[an officer of a corporation who takes part in the commission of a tort
by the corporation is personally liable therefor, [and] an officer of a
corporation who takes no part in the commission of a tort committed
by the corporation is not personally liable unless he specifically
directed the particular act to be done or particiated or co-operated
therein."25
The court found that Cherry may be relied upon only in cases in which
the evidence is insufficient to pierce the corporate veil but that personal
liability can still attach if the officer personally committed a tortious act
or personally directed that one be committed.2" The court reasoned
that Speir's argument ignored the result of the successful veil-piercing
claim achieved by plaintiff-that is, by finding that the corporate veil
ceased to exist, Speir's privity of interest with McFrugal and his identity
as an operating officer and stockholder of McFrugal were exposed.27 To
support its analysis, the court quoted the following:
"[Tihe trend is becoming more and more pronounced that the jurisdiction of all the states, including Georgia, are breaking down the
impregnability of this fiction of the separateness of the corporation and
its members. More sympathetically and more frequently are the courts
coming to realize the fallacy of this fiction so that the law of corporations is developing along the lines that a corporation cannot be
considered without taking into account its life-blood, its activities
supplied by, interwoven with, and related to the individuals who
constitute its members, shareholders and stockholders."28
The dissent, written by Judge Blackburn, diverged from the majority
opinion on the ground that the majority would wrongfully permit a
corporate officer to be held liable for actions of a corporation without
requiring (1) that the corporate officer be a party to the suit, and (2)

22. Id. at 400, 509 S.E.2d at 691.
23. 204 Ga. App. 833, 420 S.E.2d 763 (1992).
24. 235 Ga. App. at 400, 509 S.E.2d at 691.
25. 204 Ga. App. at 834, 420 S.E.2d at 765 (quoting Smith v. Hawks, 182 Ga. App. 379,
385, 355 S.E.2d 669, 675 (1987)) (alterations by court).
26. 235 Ga. App. at 400, 509 S.E.2d at 691.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 399, 509 S.E.2d at 690-91 (quoting JEROME L. KAPLAN ET AL., GEORGIA
CORPORATIONS, LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES

(alteration by court).

§

3-14 (1998))
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evidence that directly ties the officer to the commission of the tort.29
As to the first point, Judge Blackburn suggested that "[n]o matter how
egregious the facts, a party must still be afforded notice and the
30
opportunity to defend actions brought against them individually."
Judge Blackburn noted that the first judgment at the trial court level,
holding that the two corporations were operated as one entity, did not
name Speir as a party.31 The second judgment, holding the corporate
officers personally liable for the prior judgment,
did not rest upon any
32
evidence linking Speir to any tortious activity.

The dissent refuted the majority's conclusion that Speir did not resign
his duties as a corporate officer in December 1994. Speir's testimony
that he resigned by giving notice at a board of directors meeting
complied with the version of O.C.G.A. section 14-2-843 then in effect,
which provided that "'[a]n officer may resign at any time by delivering
notice to the corporation. A resignation is effective when the notice is
delivered unless the notice specifies a later effective date. A copy of the
'34
notice of resignation ... may be filed with the Secretary of State.'
The dissent emphasized that, contrary to the majority's holding, a
resignation may be effective regardless of whether notice is actually filed
with the Secretary of State. 35 As a result, the resignation allegedly
tendered by Speir at the December 1994 meeting was effective, and the
acts upon which the original action was based were committed well after
Speir's resignation.36
2. Corporation May Not Assert a Claim to Pierce its Own
Corporate Veil in Bankruptcy Proceeding Under Georgia
Law. The issue of whether a bankruptcy trustee of a corporate debtor
under Chapter 7 has standing to assert a claim to pierce the corporate
veil of the debtor to pay the debtor's debts was addressed by the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia in
Ellenberg v. Waliagha (In re Mattress N' More, Inc.).37 There, the
trustee filed suit against Amjad Waliagha and nineteen corporate
entities ("entities"), each of which was wholly-owned by Waliagha. In

29. Id. at 403, 509 S.E.2d at 693 (Blackburn, J., dissenting).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 403-04, 509 S.E.2d at 693. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 14-2-843(a) (Supp. 1999))

(emphasis added by court).
35.

Id. at 404, S.E.2d at 693.

36. Id.
37.

231 B.R. 104 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1998).
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the complaint, the trustee alleged that each of the entities had been
operated by Waliagha in an abusive and fraudulent manner resulting in
an injustice to its creditors. Mattress N' More, ("debtor") was one of
entities and manufactured, ordered inventories, and made joint
purchases of the other entities. The common expenses were not,
however, allocated among the entities, which conducted operations as
one entity to sell mattresses and related products. The trustee further
alleged that (1) control over the entities was exercised in a central
location; (2) Waliagha kept the entities' checkbooks in one location; (3)
Waliagha signed all checks; (4) the entities failed to file corporate tax
returns for 1996 and 1997; (5) Waliagha commingled entities' funds; and
(6) none of the entities observed any corporate formalities. The trustee
sought to hold each of the entities jointly and severally liable for
$350,000, the total amount owned to the creditors.38
The entities responded that the trustee lacked standing to assert an
alter ego claim under Georgia law; rather, any veil-piercing claim
belonged to the individual creditors. The parties agreed that the trustee
had no standing under section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code but disagreed
over the trustee's standing under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code,
which defines the property of the estate in bankruptcy.39 In Butner v.
United States, ° the United States Supreme Court held that property
rights belonging to a debtor under state law become assets of the
bankruptcy estate upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. 41 Federal
circuit courts look to state law when analyzing standing under section
541 to pursue an alter ego claim.42
In its analysis, the bankruptcy court cited two cases by other
bankruptcy courts in Georgia to support the rule that an alter ego claim
under Georgia law is essentially a suit in equity and permits a debtor
corporation to name its shareholders liable for the debts of the corporation. 43 Thus, an alter ego claim is property of the bankruptcy estate
under section 541 and may be properly asserted by the trustee. 4
Defendants argued, however, that no Georgia state court had ever

38. Id. at 106.
39. Id. at 107; see also 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994).
40. 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
41. Id. at 54.
42. 231 B.R. at 107.
43. Id. at 109 (citing Stamps v. Knoblock (In re City Communications, Ltd.), 105 B.R.
1018, 1022 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989); Moore v. Kumer (In re Adams Furniture Indus., Inc.),
191 B.R. 249, 255 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996)).
44. Id.
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addressed the issue of whether an alter ego claim may be brought by the
corporation to pierce its own corporate veil.45
The court concluded that the Georgia Supreme Court would "probably
not allow a corporation to assert a claim to pierce its own corporate
veil."4" To support this conclusion, the court relied exclusively on policy
grounds and did not cite any primary Georgia authority.47 It would be
"anomalous," the court suggested, to allow a corporation to assert a claim
against itself to "destroy the very protection for which it was created."4
However, the court backtracked from its broad reasoning and stated that
the trustee had standing to assert claims against the entities for
improper transfers from the debtor and to sue any corporate agents for
breach of fiduciary duty or negligence.49 In conclusion, the court
suggested that it might, indeed, make sense for the trustee in bankruptcy to assert alter ego claims as a representative of the bankrupt
estate. 50 Because there is no statutory basis for such a veil-piercing
theory in the Bankruptcy Code, the court pointed to Congress as the
proper vehicle for striking a balance "between the goals of bankruptcy
legislation and creditor's rights and the policies of economic 5expansion
1
which lay behind the state law doctrines of limited liability."
B.

Liability for PreincorporationDebts of a Business

In Jamal v. Hussein ("Jamal II), ' the court of appeals considered
whether a partner can hold other partners in a common venture liable
for loans made to an as-yet-to-be-formed corporation or, alternatively,
whether the subsequently formed corporation automatically assumes
liability for repayment of the loans.
Plaintiff, Jamal, persuaded

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. The court further stated "it is relatively difficult to pierce the corporate veil in
Georgia." Id. (citing STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 2.11, at 2-91
(1998)). However, given the numerous Georgia cases holding corporate agents liable for
the debts of corporation, this broad assertion is somewhat dubious. See cases cited supra
notes 2-7.
48. 231 B.R. at 109.
49. Id. The court noted that, to prevail on these claims, the trustee would have to
bring the entities into bankruptcy court, at which point the trustee could move for
substantive consolidation, with notice to all creditors of the named corporate defendants.
Id. at 109 n.4.
50. Id. at 109-10.
51. Id. at 110.
52. 237 Ga. App. 779, 515 S.E.2d 407 (1999). In Jamal v. Pirani,227 Ga. App. 713, 490
S.E.2d 140 (1997) ("Jamal 1"), the court affirmed the trial court's ruling that any oral
promises made among Jamal, Pirani, and Hussein pursuant to an oral partnership
agreement terminated upon incorporation of the business. Id. at 714, 490 S.E.2d at 141.
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defendants, Pirani and Hussein, to go into the convenience store
business with him. Jamal reserved a name for the corporation, Ark
International, Inc. ("Ark"), with the Secretary of State and borrowed
$30,000 against his personal credit cards for the purchase of the first
convenience store. He deposited the money into an account bearing the
name of the as-yet-to-be-formed corporation. Meanwhile, Pirani
negotiated for the purchase of the first store, which Hussein agreed to
manage. After the purchase of the first store closed, Jamal made
additional loans to fund the purchase of a second store. Approximately
one month later, Ark was incorporated with each of the associates
owning one-third of its shares. After a dispute erupted, Jamal sued his
business associates, claiming that Pirani and Hussein were liable for
Ark's preincorporation debts, which consisted of the loans, even though
Jamal loaned the money to Ark and neither
Pirani nor Hussein made
53
any personal guarantees for repayment.
The court affirmed the trial court's ruling that O.C.G.A. section 14-2204, which creates joint and several liability for preincorporation
debts,54 does not apply when the claimant knew the corporation did not
exist at the time the loans were made.5" The court reasoned that
Jamal could not have made the loans to a corporate entity that was not
yet formed.56 Indeed, Jamal could not have been misled into believing
that Pirani and Hussein were "'purporting to act as or on behalf of"' the
yet-to-be-formed corporation because Jamal had adequate information
to know the corporation had not yet been formed. 7 There was no
evidence to indicate that Jamal believed Ark had been incorporated
when he made the loans.58 Rather, Jamal loaned the money to the
partnership, which rendered O.C.G.A. section 14-2-204 inapplicable.59
The court distinguished those cases in which section 14-2-204 provided
a remedy because business associates took advantage of an aggrieved
party when the claimant was ignorant of the fact that no corporation
existed."°

53. 237 Ga. App. at 779-80, 515 S.E.2d at 409.
54. This section provides, "All persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation,
knowing there was no incorporation under this chapter, are jointly and severally liable for
all liabilities created while so acting." O.C.G.A. § 14-2-204 (1994).
55. 237 Ga. App. at 780, 515 S.E.2d at 409.
56. Id. at 781, 515 S.E.2d at 409.
57. Id., 515 S.E.2d at 410 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 14-2-204).
58. Id.
59. Id., 515 S.E.2d at 409.
60. Id., 515 S.E.2d at 410 (citing Zuberi v. Gimbert, 230 Ga. App. 471, 473, 496 S.E.2d
741, 742 (1998); Weir v. Kirby Constr. Co., 213 Ga. App. 832, 834, 446 S.E.2d 186, 187
(1994); Video Power, Inc. v. First Capital Income Properties, Inc., 188 Ga. App. 691, 692,

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

The court next turned to the issue of whether a corporation succeeding
a partnership becomes automatically liable for the debts of the partnership. 6' The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Pirani
and Hussein on this issue, finding that the corporation had replaced the
partnership and that, therefore, as a matter of law, Pirani and Hussein
could not be held liable for the loan. 2 However, the appellate court
found that the terms surrounding the transfer of partnership assets and
liabilities to the corporation were nebulous and, therefore, raised a
question of fact.63 To illustrate, the court pointed to leases signed by
Jamal, Pirani, and Hussein for land to be occupied by future stores.6 4
They never transferred the leases to the corporate books after the
formation of Ark, and a transfer would not take effect unless they took
affirmative steps for the corporation to assume the leases.65 In
addition, there was conflicting testimony concerning whether Pirani and
Hussein were liable for repayment of Jamal's loan. 6 The court
concluded that the jury must determine whether the parties intended for
the liability created by the loan to migrate to the corporation or remain
with the partnership.67
C. Covenants Not to Compete
The increase of issues involving noncompetition and nonsolicitation
agreements is in step with the increasing mobility of today's workforce.
Now more than ever employees at all levels of the corporate hierarchy
are subject to such agreements. Indeed, just as employment contracts

373 S.E.2d 855, 856 (1988)).
61. Id. at 781-82, 515 S.E.2d at 410.
62. Id. at 782-83, 515 S.E.2d at 411.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 781-82, 515 S.E.2d at 410.
65. Id. at 782, 515 S.E.2d at 410; see also Dickson-Carroll Co. v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 58 Ga. App. 540, 541, 199 S.E. 322, 322 (1938) ("Where a partnership is
succeeded by a corporation, the corporation is not liable for the debts of the partnership not
assumed in a manner recognized by law.").
66. 237 Ga. App. at 782, 515 S.E.2d at 411.
67. Id. at 782-83, 515 S.E.2d at 411. The court also concluded that a factual issue
existed on plaintiffs piercing the corporate veil theory. Id. at 783, 515 S.E.2d at 411.
Plaintiff claimed that after incorporation, Hussein and Jamal commingled Ark's assets with
their own. Id. Because a factual issue existed as to whether Ark assumed the debts of the
partnership, plaintiffs attempt to hold the other shareholders of the corporation liable
remained viable. Id. The record revealed several evidentiary points creating a material
issue of fact for the jury, including the facts that (1) there were no shareholder or director
meetings; (2) no stock in the corporation was issued; (3) there may have been "transfers"
of merchandise between corporate entities owned by the parties; and (4) cash payments
flowed to Hussein and Pirani from corporate entities although no record of such payments
existed. Id.
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governing key employees are the norm, so are challenges to the
provisions of those contracts. Georgia courts have responded to the
growth in this substantive area with a straightforward analytical
structure. Courts analyze three factors when determining the reasonableness of the challenged restrictions, including (1) duration, (2)
territorial coverage, and (3) scope of the prohibited activity.6" The
question of the reasonableness of the imposed restraint is a question of
law for the court.69
It is worth noting that "blue pencilling" of the offending restrictive
covenants is prohibited under Georgia law, even if the contract includes
a severability clause.7" A covenant not to compete or a nonsolicitation
agreement must stand on its own or fail in its entirety; thus it is
advisable to scrutinize these clauses and reference the prevailing law
prior to committing to specific language.
In Reardigan v. Shaw Industries, Inc.," a predecessor to Shaw
Industries ("Shaw") hired Reardigan in 1990 to sell carpet and floor
coverings in the Atlanta metropolitan area. Reardigan met with
developers and construction contractors on a regular basis for the
purpose of submitting competitive bids for supplying flooring to various
projects.72
Two years later, Reardigan signed a noncompetition
agreement that provided as follows:
"You covenant and agree that during your employment.., and for a
period ending on December 31st of the calendar year following the
calendar year in which your employment terminates, you will not, on
your own behalf or in the service or on behalf of others, compete with
[employer] anywhere within the Atlanta Metropolitan Statistical Area
[("AMSA")]... by engaging or attempting to engage in the business of
buying, selling and installing carpet and other floor coverings for
residential or commercial uses, in circumstances where your responsi-

68. See, e.g., Sysco Food Servs. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Chupp, 225 Ga. App. 584, 585, 484
S.E.2d 323, 325 (1997); Pittman v. Harbin Clinic Profl Ass'n, 210 Ga. App. 767, 768, 437
S.E.2d 619, 621 (1993).
69. Rollins Protective Servs., Co. v. Palermo, 249 Ga. 138, 139, 287 S.E.2d 546, 548
(1982). The reasonableness analysis is informed by the following structure: a court will
apply (1) "strict scrutiny" to restrictive covenants ancillary to employment agreements, (2)
a middle level of scrutiny to restrictive covenants found in professional partnership
agreements, and (3) a much lesser degree of scrutiny to restrictive covenants ancillary to
the sale of a business. See Habif, Arogeti & Wynne, P.C. v. Baggett, 231 Ga. App. 289,
289-91, 498 S.E.2d 346, 349-50 (1998).
70. See, e.g., McNease v. National Motor Club of Am., Inc., 238 Ga. 53, 56, 231 S.E.2d
58, 61 (1976); Harville v. Gunter, 230 Ga. App. 198, 200, 495 S.E.2d 862, 864 (1998).
71. 238 Ga. App. 142, 518 S.E.2d 144 (1999).
72. Id. at 142, 518 S.E.2d at 145.
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bilities and duties are substantially similar to those performed by you
for [employer]. "7
Reardigan also signed the following nonsolicitation agreement:
"You covenant and agree that during your employment with [employer]
and for a period ending on December 31st of the calendar year
following the calendar year in which your employment terminates, you
will not, anywhere within the [AMSA], on your own behalf or in the
service or on behalf of others, call on, solicit or take away as a client
or customer or attempt to call on, solicit or take away as a client or
customer any individual, partnership, corporation or association that
was a client or customer of [employer] and was serviced by you or
under your supervision during your employment with [employer]."74
Reardigan resigned from Shaw on June 26, 1998, and took a job with
a direct competitor, which resulted in the lawsuit.7 5 The trial court
granted injunctive relief to the employer, finding that the restrictions
were reasonable." On appeal the court noted that it "may consider the
nature and extent of the business, the situation of the parties, and all
other relevant circumstances." 7
Reardigan claimed that the duration of both covenants was unreasonable because the length of the imposed restriction varied depending on
the date of termination of employment." The court held, however, that
the restrictions were ascertainable immediately upon the employee's
termination and that they contemplated a definite end, December 31 of
the second calendar year after termination." Moreover, the maximum
possible length of the duration, two years, fell within the duration held
permissible by Georgia courts.8 ° For these reasons, the court held that
the contract was reasonable with respect to duration.8 '
Next, the court analyzed whether the territorial coverage was too
broad. 2 The court considered the radius within which certain counties
lie as relevant to the reasonableness inquiry.13 The court noted that

73. Id.
74. Id. at 143, 518 S.E.2d at 145-46.
75. Id., 518 S.E.2d at 146.
76. Id. at 142, 518 S.E.2d at 145.
77. Id. at 143, 518 S.E.2d at 146 (citing W. R. Grace & Co., Dearborn Div. v. Mouyal,
262 Ga. 464, 465, 422 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1992)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 144, 518 S.E.2d at 146.
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing Pittman, 210 Ga. App. 769, 437 S.E.2d 622).
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territorial limit of a fifty-mile radius has been held to be reasonable. 4
Generally, in construing territorial limitations in employment contracts,
trial courts must look at the reasonableness of the restriction in light of
the surrounding facts and circumstances.85 A restriction relating to the
area in which the employee is employed, as opposed to the territory in
which he actively solicits business, will usually be enforced because "'a
court will accept as prima facie valid a covenant related to the territory
where the employee was employed as a legitimate protection of the
employer's investment in customer relations and good will.'"8 "
The eighteen counties within the AMSA, with the exception of a small
portion of one county, lay well within a fifty-mile radius of the employer's business.8 7 Evidence at trial tended to show that Reardigan
submitted successful bids in eight of the eighteen counties within the
AMSA; however, Reardigan solicited business in all eighteen counties. 88
The court found that because of the nature of Reardigan's work, his
employment territory included the location of the actual projects for
which he solicited, not merely the corporate offices of the general
contractors at which he made sales calls.89 "In contrast to the regional
salesperson assigned to call on customers in a particular territory,
Reardigan relied upon his relationships with contractors and developers
to obtain subcontracts for the installation of carpet." ° The evidence
showed that those contractors and developers worked throughout the
AMSA. 91
Finally, Reardigan contended that the territorial restriction was
impermissibly vague because the AMSA section at issue had changed
since he executed his employment contract containing the restrictive

84. Id. (citing Smith v. HBT, Inc., 213 Ga. App. 560, 563, 445 S.E.2d 315, 318 (1994)).
85. Id., 518 S.E.2d at 147.
86. Id. (quoting Rollins ProtectiveServs. Co., 249 Ga. at 140, 287 S.E.2d at 549). The
supreme court in Rollins Protective Services Co. further stated,
"[A] court will enforce an agreement prohibiting an employee from pirating his
former employer's customers served by the employee, during the employment, at
the employer's direct or indirect expense. Conversely, a court will not accept as
prima facie valid a covenant related to the territory where the employer does
business where the only justification is that the employer wants to avoid
competition by the employee in that area."
249 Ga. at 140, 287 S.E.2d at 549 (quoting Howard Schultz & Assocs. of the Southeast, Inc.
v. Broniec, 239 Ga. 181, 184, 236 S.E.2d 265, 268 (1977)).
87. 238 Ga. App. at 144, 518 S.E.2d at 146.
88. Id., 518 S.E.2d at 147.
89. Id. at 144-45, 518 S.E.2d at 147.
90. Id. at 144, 518 S.E.2d at 146.
91. Id., 518 S.E.2d at 147.
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The court stated that the definiteness of a territorial
covenants."
restriction is determined by looking at the time of execution, not at the
time of breach.13 Thus, although the United States Office of Management and Budget later redefined the AMSA, Reardigan knew exactly
and had the ability
what the territory entailed at the time of execution
94
to ascertain if the AMSA changed in the interim.
In Keeley v. CardiovascularSurgical Associates, PC.," Cardiovascular Surgical Associates ("CSA") hired Dr. Samual Keeley as a heart
surgeon. As part of his employment agreement, Keeley signed the
following noncompetition covenant: "'In the event either of us terminate
your employment or dissolve the partnership, a restrictive covenant
would operate to prohibit your establishing a competing cardiovascular
surgery practice within a 75 mile radius of Albany, Georgia for 96a period
of two years following the date of termination or dissolution.'
Several months after hiring Keeley, CSA discovered Keeley was
abusing drugs. Keeley subsequently entered a substance abuse
treatment program, but CSA terminated his employment shortly
thereafter in January 1998. Five months later, Keeley announced his
intention to open a competing cardiovascular surgical practice in Albany
and filed for a declaratory judgment to have the noncompetition
covenant declared unenforceable. CSA counterclaimed to enjoin Keeley
from violating the covenant. The trial court found for CSA and enjoined
January 2000, two
Keeley from operating a competing practice until
97
years after his termination. Keeley appealed.
The court of appeals first addressed Keeley's claim that the trial court
erred in finding that CSA's business interests would be protected by
enforcement of the covenant not to compete because the two current
shareholders of CSA were no longer directly employed by CSA. Rather,
they operated as separate professional corporations and performed
surgeries on CSA's patients.9 8 The court of appeals upheld the trial
court's finding that CSA was in the business of providing medical
services and had developed a significant network of referring physicians
and patients throughout the protected territory.9 9 Further, the court
concluded that competition by Keeley would reduce the number of

92.
93.

Id. at 145, 518 S.E.2d at 147.
Id.

94. Id.
95.
96.
97.
98.

236 Ga. App. 26, 510 S.E.2d 880 (1999).
Id. at 26, 510 S.E.2d at 882.
Id.
Id. at 28, 510 S.E.2d at 883-84.

99. Id. at 29, 510 S.E.2d at 884.
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procedures by CSA and its patient and referral base, thereby reducing
its income and weakening its reputation."°
The court next addressed Keeley's claim that the covenant was
impermissibly vague in its description of the geographic territory
because one allegedly could not discern whether the seventy-five-mile
radius was to be measured, from the Albany city limits or from
downtown Albany.1"' In finding the covenant immune from a challenge of vagueness, the court summarily declared the geographic
restriction enforceable on the following ground: "'The use of the word
'radius' presupposes a circle, the center of which is the center of
[Albany]. It takes no considerable construction to place the center of
that circle in the middle of downtown [Albany],
giving a clear starting
" 10 2
place for measuring the area' of restriction.
Keeley also claimed that the restricted area was too large and
overprotected the legitimate business interests of CSA and that no
Georgia court had upheld a physician's covenant covering that many
square miles.' 3 The court reasoned that the covenant was part of a
larger agreement whereby Keeley was to become an equal owner of CSA
within eighteen months, and therefore, it was subject to a "middle level"
of "reduced scrutiny" given to professional contracts (in which case the
parties are considered to have equal bargaining power) as opposed to the
"strict level" of scrutiny applicable to a standard, stand-alone employment agreement.'
Accordingly, the court upheld the reasonableness
of the noncompete provision.' 5
In Wolff v. Protege Systems, Inc., 1' Protege sought injunctive relief
against Wolff, a former employee of Protege, and DP Solutions, Wolff's
present employer, to stop Wolff from allegedly violating covenants not to
compete and from disclosing confidential information. The parties
provided consulting and support services to business customers using a
unique computer software package developed by Synon, Inc.'0 7 While
at Protege, Wolff signed an employment agreement which provided that,
for one year after the date of termination, Wolff could not

100.
101.
102.
S.E.2d
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 30, 510 S.E.2d at 884-85 (quoting Hamrick v. Kelley, 260 Ga. 307, 309, 392
518, 520 (1990) (Benham, J., dissenting)).
Id., 510 S.E.2d at 885.
Id. at 30-31, 510 S.E.2d at 885.
Id.
234 Ga. App. 251, 506 S.E.2d 429 (1998).
Id. at 251, 506 S.E.2d at 431.
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"directly or indirectly, own, manage, operate, join, control, undertake
planning for or organization of any business activity competitive with
the business of Protege, or combine or conspire with other employees
of Protege for the purpose of organizing any such competitive business
activity, or be employed in any manner with any business of the type
and character of business engaged in by Protege at the time of such
termination." °8
The noncompete provision further provided that the agreement "'shall
be bound by the following geographical territory; Clayton, Cobb, Dekalb
and Fulton Counties located in the state of Georgia"' and "'shall not
restrict or prohibit the employee from engaging in providing computer
related software applications not used, offered, and/or developed by
Protege, so long as the customer and the employee's place of business are
located entirely outside the area.'"10 9
The trial court enjoined Wolff from actively soliciting business from
Protege's customers.11 ° On appeal the court found that the noncompete provision purported to prevent Wolff from obtaining employment
from any competitor in any capacity, which is precisely the type of
covenant Georgia courts have held to be overbroad, unreasonable, and
prohibited by the Georgia Constitution.'11 In addition, the court found
the restriction unenforceable because it overly restricted Wolff's ability
to conduct business (even outside the restricted territory) in the realm
of Synon software, which is "used" by Protege." 2
The agreement at issue also contained the following "'nonsolicitation
of customers'" provision:
"During the term of this agreement, and for a period of one year
immediately following the termination of his/her employment with
Protege, the employee shall not ... call on, solicit, or take away, or
attempt to call, solicit, or attempt to take away any of the customers
of Protege [on whom the employee called or with whom he/she became
acquainted while employed at Protege], either for himself or for any
other person, firm or corporation."113
Even though Wolff only did business with eight of Protege's fifteen
customers, Protege sought to restrict Wolff from doing business with any

108. Id. at 252, 506 S.E.2d at 432.
109. Id. at 252-53, 506 S.E.2d at 432 (emphasis added by court).
110. Id. at 252, 506 S.E.2d at 432.
111. Id. (citing National Settlement Assocs. of Ga., Inc. v. Creel, 256 Ga. 329, 332, 349
S.E.2d 177, 180 (1986); McNease v. National Motor Club of Am., Inc., 238 Ga. 53, 56, 231
S.E.2d 58, 60 (1976)); see also GA. CONST. art. IV, § 4, para. 1.
112. 234 Ga. App. at 252-53, 506 S.E.2d at 432.
113. Id. at 253, 506 S.E.2d at 432 (alteration by court).
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of them. 114 The court reasoned that if this covenant had been "restricted to customers Wolff 'called on' while at Protege, it might have been
reasonable.""'
However, as drafted the covenant impermissibly
prohibited Wolff from soliciting or calling on any customer of Protege,
"regardless of whether he had a business relationship with those
customers while employed at Protege, so long as he 'became acquainted
with' them while at Protege."" 6
D.

Legislative Changes

The 1999 session of the Georgia General Assembly passed several
amendments to the Georgia Business Corporation Code" 7 and the
Georgia Limited Liability Company Act,"' the most notable of which
are summarized below.
1. Electronic Filing. The legislature amended O.C.G.A. section 142-120 to provide for the electronic filing of documents relative to
business corporations with the Secretary of State." 9 O.C.G.A. section
14-2-127 establishes
the evidentiary value of an electronically filed
0
document. 12
2. Electronic Proxies. The legislature amended O.C.G.A. section
14-2-722 to provide that shareholders may by means of an electronic
transmission appoint proxies to vote for them.'2'
3. Publication of Notice to Change Name. The legislature
amended O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1006.1 to allow corporations more time
to deliver notice of intent to change the corporate name to the publisher
of a certain newspaper in the county where the corporation's registered
office is located. 2 2 Corporations now have until "the next business day
following the delivery of the articles of amendment and certificate as
provided in subsection (a) of this Code section." 123 The former version
of O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1006.1 required notice to be delivered to the
publisher prior to the filing of the articles of amendment.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id., 506 S.E.2d at 432-33.
Id., 506 S.E.2d at 433.
Id.
O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-101 to -1703 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
Id. §§ 14-11-100 to -1109.
Id. § 14-2-120(i).
Id. § 14-2-127.
Id. § 14-2-722(b).
Id. § 14-2-1006.1(b).
Id.
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4. Mergers. The legislature amended O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1104 to
allow a parent corporation to merge with a subsidiary
corporation
124
without shareholder approval under certain conditions.
5. Beneficial Owner. The legislature amended the definition of the
term "beneficial owner" to exclude from the definition an owner of
equity securities which (i) have been tendered pursuant to a tender or
exchange offer made by such person or such person's affiliates or
associates until such tendered stock is accepted for purchase or
exchange or (ii) such person or such person's affiliates or associates
have the right to vote pursuant to any agreement, arrangement, or
understanding if the agreement, arrangement, or understanding to vote
such stock arises solely from a125revocable proxy or consent solicitation
made to ten or more persons.
6. Foreign Corporations.

The legislature added a paragraph to

O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1501 to change the provisions relating to the
activities of a foreign corporation that do not constitute "transacting
business." 2 ' Serving as a manager of a limited liability company is an
activity that does not constitute "transacting business" under the

Code.' 27
7. Limited Liability Companies. The legislature amended
O.C.G.A. section 14-11-405 (effective for LLCs formed on or after July 1,
1999) to provide that "a member with respect to which an event of
dissociation occurs is not entitled to receive any payment by reason of
such event and will become an assignee as to such limited liability
company interest."'28 The legislature also amended O.C.G.A. section
14-11-610 to require a dissolved limited liability company to deliver to
the Secretary of State a certificate of dissolution containing certain
information provided for therein.'2 9

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. § 14-2-1104(a)-(b).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 14-2-1110(4)(C).
§ 14-2-1501(b)(14).
§ 14-11-405(b).
§ 14-11-610.
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SECURITIES

A. United States District Courts in Georgia Address Heightened
PleadingStandard Governing State of Mind Required to Establish
Scienter in Section 10(b) Actions
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Section 10(b)")
makes it unlawful for any person to use, in connection with the sale of
any security, any deceptive device.' 0 Rule 10(b)-5, promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") pursuant to Section 10(b),
prohibits the making of any untrue statement of material fact or the
omission of a material fact that would render statements misleadTo state a claim under Rule 10(b)-5, a plaintiff must allege that
ing.'
the defendant made a misstatement or omission of material fact with
scienter and in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, that
the plaintiff relied upon the misstatement or omission, and that this
reliance proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries. 1 32 The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA")' 33 revised the
pleading standards for alleging fraud in securities class action law-

suits."a

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999). Rule 10b-5 provides the following:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.

130.
131.

Id.
132. Robbins v. Koger Properties, Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1997).
133. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 743 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
134. Specifically, the PSLRA provides the following:
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff alleges
that the defendant(A) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(B) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances in which they were made, not
misleading;
the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the
reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding
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In Sturm v. Marriott Marquis Corp.,' 3 a group of 720 limited partners in a hotel partnership ("Marquis Limited Partnership I") sued the
general partner, the Marriott Marquis Corporation, for federal securities
fraud, state law breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract relating
to the merger of the Marquis Limited Partnership I into a new limited
partnership ("Marquis Limited Partnership II").'
Judge Thrash
ruled, among other things, that the limited partners failed to meet the
heightened pleading standard for scienter under the PSLRA.' 37
The Host Marriott Corporation ("Marriott") formed numerous limited
partnerships during the late 1980s to acquire, own, and operate hotel
properties around the world. Marriott formed the Marquis Limited
Partnership I in 1985 to acquire an eighty percent interest in the Ivy
Street Hotel Limited Partnership, which developed and owned the
Atlanta Marriott Marquis Hotel, a 1671 room luxury hotel ("Hotel") in
downtown Atlanta, Georgia. The Marquis Limited Partnership I
eventually sold 530 Class A partnership interests for $100,000 each
("Class A Units") to 720 investors ("Limited Partners") and a number of
Class B partnership interests with no value ("Class B Units"). The
Limited Partners, all unsophisticated investors, owned ninety-nine
percent of the Class A Units. The Marriott Marquis Corporation
("General Partner") owned one percent of the Class A Units and onehundred percent of the Class B Units.' 38
The Hotel failed to perform as expected. The Limited Partners
enjoyed certain tax losses but received less cash distributions than
anticipated. Although operations improved in the 1990s, the Hotel's
$217 million mortgage was coming due and the Hotel needed significant
renovations. To facilitate the refinancing of the mortgage and to avoid
foreclosure, Marriott formed the Marquis Limited Partnership II and
became the general partner. Seeking limited partners for the Marquis

the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall
state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1). Congress passed the PSLRA of 1995 ("PSLRA") to deter alleged
abuses by the plaintiffs' bar involving cases brought under the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Supporters of the PSLRA hoped its passage would
discourage "strike-suits" or claims action against a corporation and its officers and directors
because of a drop in the corporation's stock price. The hope of the PSLRA's supporters has
not been realized; in the three full years since its passage, the number of securities cases
filed in federal district courts has increased 134%, from 102 filings in 1996 to 239 filings
in 1998. Gary Lockwood, Seeking Cover in the Age of Litigation, Bus. L. TODAY, Sept./Oct.
1999, at 12.
135. 26 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (N.D. Ga. 1998).
136. Id. at 1362.
137. Id.
138. Id.

1999]

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

147

Limited Partnership II, Marriott mailed a Consent Solicitation and
Prospectus ("Prospectus") to the Limited Partners of the Marquis
Limited Partnership I. The Prospectus, which contained various
disclosures, sought approval from the Limited Partners for a one-for-one
exchange of all Class A Units of the Marquis Limited Partnership I for
Class A Units of the Marquis Limited Partnership II, a merger that
would result in the Limited Partners holding ninety-nine percent of the
Class A Units. Marriott proposed the restructuring because of its belief
that not enough of the Limited Partners would agree simply to amend
the Marquis Limited Partnership I agreement. A majority of the
Limited Partners voted to approve the merger, and the Marquis Limited
Partnership I dissolved.'3 9
The Prospectus disclosed several changes to the rights of the Limited
Partners, including: (1) that holders of Class A Units would be entitled
to a subordinated five percent return on their investment paid at the
sole discretion of Marriott, as opposed to a ten percent priority return on
their investment under the Marquis Limited Partnership I; (2) that
holders of Class B Units would be entitled to a 13.5% preferred,
cumulative, and compounded return, as opposed to no priority returns
under the Marquis Limited Partnership I; (3) that Marriott's parent
corporation's twenty-year non-interest-bearing loan to the Ivy Street
Limited Partnership was converted into a fifteen-year loan with a nine
percent interest rate for the first five years and that repayment of the
loan was given priority over rental payments to the Limited Partners;
and (4) that Marriott's parent corporation was released from its
guarantee of up to $50 million on the original mortgage. The Marquis
Limited Partnership II agreement also gave Marriott voting rights and
the ability
to sell the Hotel without the consent of the holders of Class
140
A Units.
Plaintiffs contended that the merger was unfair because (1) no
independent entity represented the Limited Partners' interests in the
restructuring; (2) there was no appraisal right of the Hotel; (3) there
were no arms-length transactions on behalf of the Limited Partners; (4)
alternatives to the restructuring were not offered; and (5) the terms of
the restructuring unfairly benefited Marriott, the general partner. The
complaint alleged that defendants were liable under Section 10(b) for
making false statements and concealing material facts in connection
with the restructuring. Defendants contended that the restructuring
was necessary to prevent a foreclosure on the Hotel and that the terms

139. Id. at 1362-63.
140. Id. at 1363-64.
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of the merger and 4its financial consequences were fully disclosed to the
Limited Partners.1 '
The court ruled on defendants' motion to dismiss under the new
pleading requirements of the PSLRA.' 4 ' The PSLRA requires that a
securities-fraud plaintiff "specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading" and "the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading.""'
Allegations regarding statements or omissions made on
information and belief must be framed in the complaint with sufficient
particularity.' 4 The complaint must "with respect to each act or
omission alleged to violate [the PSLRAI, state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind."'45 Under these rules, the court found that
plaintiffs' allegations concerning defendants' failure to disclose the true
value to the Hotel and failure to disclose the resale value of the Class A
Units satisfied the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.' 46 Next, the court found that the failure to
disclose the true value of the Hotel was material because information
included in the Prospectus estimated the value to be approximately $250
million, whereas plaintiffs estimated it to be in the neighborhood of $300
million, and a reasonable investor would have14considered
the difference
7
important in making its investment decision.
Before the passage of the PSLRA, a showing of "severe recklessness"
satisfied the scienter requirement of Rule 10b-5 in the Eleventh
Circuit.' 4" However, the Eleventh Circuit had no special pleading
requirement for Rule 10b-5 actions. 149 The PSLRA has established
that a claimant must show a "strong inference" that the defendant acted
with the required fraudulent state of mind for each statement or

141. Id. at 1364. Defendants included Marriott, Marriott's parent corporation, and
members of Marriott's Board of Directors.
142. Id. at 1365.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1).
144. Id.
145. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2).
146. 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1365-66. Rule 9(b) requires that "in all averments of fraud or
mistake the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."
FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b).
147. 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1366.
148. See McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814 (11th Cir. 1989).
The court in McDonald defined "severe recklessness" as "not merely simple or even
inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and
that present a danger of misleading buyers or sellers which is either known to the
defendant or is so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it." Id.
149. 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1367.
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omission of fact. 15
This standard did not, however, change the
required state of mind with respect to an allegation of securities
fraud."15

Prior to the passage of the PSLRA, several courts adopted a pleading
standard crafted by the Second Circuit that allowed a claimant to allege
facts (1) that showed the defendant had both the motive and opportunity
to commit fraud or (2) that constituted strong circumstantial evidence of
conscious misbehavior or recklessness.1 12 This standard arguably
lowered the threshold of specific facts required to be pleaded by Rule
9(b). Other courts adopted a more demanding standard by holding that
the "motive and opportunity" prong of the Second Circuit's standard no
longer sufficed to raise a "strong inference" of scienter, as required by
the PSLRA.'
Thus, a conflict has arisen
among the circuit courts
15 4
regarding the scienter pleading standard.
The court in Sturm took issue with the Second Circuit's "motive and
opportunity" standard by stating that "allowing private securities class
actions to proceed to discovery upon bare allegations of motive and
opportunity would upset the delicate balance of providing a remedy for
genuine fraud while preventing abusive strike suits that the [PSLRA]
sought to achieve." ' A showing of motive and opportunity would be
insufficient to state a claim for securities fraud under the Eleventh
Circuit's "severe recklessness" standard.'56 On the other hand, the
court noted that the PSLRA does not require a showing of actual
knowledge or intentional misconduct at the pleading stage; hence, a
showing of recklessness is sufficient."l 7 "[A] plaintiff can properly
plead scienter by alleging facts constituting strong circumstantial
"18
evidence of severe recklessness or conscious misbehavior. 5
Applying the law to the facts of the case, the court concluded that the
complaint would have survived under the mere "motive and opportunity"
standard, but the heightened pleading standard of the PSLRA proved

150. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
151. 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1368 (noting that the Conference Committee Report on the
PSLRA "chose not to include in the pleading standard certain language relating to motive,
opportunity, or recklessness").
152. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994).
153. See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation, 970 F. Supp. 746, 757
(N.D. Cal. 1997).
154. This conflict was first noted during the survey period by Judge Thrash in In re
Miller Indus., Inc. Securities Litigation, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1332 (N.D. Ga. 1998).
155. 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1369.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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"fatal" to the Rule 10b-5 claim.'59 Although the complaint alleged that
the true value of the Hotel exceeded $300 million, claimants failed to
allege that Marriott and the individual defendants knew the alleged true
value and recklessly misrepresented the value of the Hotel in the
Prospectus. 6 ' This conclusion was supported by the repeated disclobetween Marriott and the Limited
sure of the conflicts of interest
16
Partners in the Prospectus. '
In a case decided on the same day as Sturm, Carley Capital Group v.
Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P,62 the same court adopted and applied the
same Rule 10b-5 pleading requirements in the context of a securities
class action filed against an auditing firm in connection with ongoing
6
litigation in In re 1996 Medaphis Corporation Securities Litigation.' 3
Plaintiffs brought the class action on behalf of persons who purchased
Medaphis Corporation ("Medaphis") common stock, which lost considerable value during the class period. Plaintiffs claimed that Deloitte &
Touche ("defendant") artificially inflated the value of Medaphis common
stock by making materially misleading public statements regarding
revenue recognition and false reporting of expenses in connection with
the 1995 financial statements and 1996 first quarter earnings reports.
The alleged overstatement of Medaphis's financial condition and
manipulation of the stock price provided Medaphis with the opportunity
to acquire other companies using its artificially inflated stock as
currency. 16
The court found that "Plaintiffs ha[d] adequately alleged that the
Defendant recklessly or consciously misrepresented the revenues,
expenses, and earnings of Medaphis to keep the stock high for the
acquisition of other companies."'65 The court noted that it would have
been insufficient for plaintiffs merely to allege a misapplication of
generally accepted accounting principles, but when this was coupled with
such a "drastic overstatement of financial results," a strong inference of
scienter arose.'6 6 Plaintiffs alleged numerous violations of accounting
principles, which in the aggregate had a significant impact on Medaphis's financial results. 7 These allegations established "more than

159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 1370.
Id.
Id.
27 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (N.D. Ga. 1998).

163.

Civil Action No. 1:96-CV-2088-TWT (N.D. Ga. filed Aug. 19, 1996).

164.
165.
166.
167.

27 F. Supp. 2d at 1331-32.
Id. at 1339.
Id.
Id.
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mere mistakes
in the exercise of professional judgment or negli" 168
gence.
Another noteworthy issue addressed by the court concerned secondary
liability under Section 10(b). Defendant contended that, in relation to
the alleged overstated 1996 first quarter earnings in which Medaphis
booked $12.5 million in revenue before it was earned, its involvement
only amounted to aiding and abetting liability, which is not actionable
under Rule 10b-5.16 9 The court considered the threshold required to
show that a secondary actor's conduct amounts to primary liability, an
issue the Eleventh Circuit had yet to address.'
The court considered
threshold standards from three different sources: In re Software
Toolworks, Inc.,171 Shapiro v. Cantor,'72 and a proposal in an amicus
curiae brief submitted by the SEC.173 The court adopted the SEC's
standard, which fell between the Ninth Circuit's standard and the
Second Circuit's standard, and held that "a secondary actor can be
primarily liable when it, acting alone or with others, creates a misrepresentation even if the misrepresentation is not publicly attributed to
it." "74
' Thus, because defendant specifically directed Medaphis to book
$12.5 million of revenues on the last day of the first quarter of 1996 for
an executed but unperformed contract, plaintiffs alleged more than mere
aiding and abetting liability.7 5
In Bryant v. Apple South, Inc., 7 6 Chief Judge Fitzpatrick of the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia addressed
Section 10b-5's pleading requirements and reached a different conclusion
regarding the applicability of the Second Circuit's "motive and opportunity" standard in the wake of the PSLRA.'7 7 In Bryant a group of stock
purchasers ("plaintiffs") sued Apple South and its top executives

168. Id. at 1340.
169. Id. at 1333; see also Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1994) (finding that Section 10(b) does not reach those
who aid and abet a violation of that statute because Congress never intended to impose
secondary liability under it).
170. 27 F. Supp. 2d at 1334.
171. 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that secondary third parties may be
primarily liable for statements made by others in which the third party significantly
participated).
172. 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that secondary third parties may be
primarily liable if they "make" a false or misleading statement).
173. The SEC argued "that an entity can be primarily liable when it, acting alone or
with others, creates a misrepresentation." 27 F. Supp. 2d at 1334.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 25 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (M.D. Ga. 1998).
177. Id. at 1379-81.
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(collectively, "defendants"), alleging that defendants illegally inflated the
price of Apple South stock by making false and misleading statements
about its expansion strategy and business prospects to raise capital for
further expansion.178
The court concluded that the standards of motive and opportunity and
recklessness had not been abolished by the PSLRA.'79 "The Conference Committee, by stating in a footnote that it did not intend to codify
the standard for motive, opportunity, or recklessness, failed to establish
that Congress chose specifically to disapprove of these tests."80 Thus,
in the Middle District of Georgia, a claimant may establish scienter in
a securities fraud action by pointing to evidence of motive, opportunity,
and recklessness.'81 This finding establishes a clear disagreement
among the federal district courts in Georgia regarding the threshold
evidentiary showing required to establish scienter under Rule 10b-5.
With respect to establishing a "strong inference" that defendants acted
with the required state of mind by illegally inflating the price of Apple
South stock, plaintiffs offered the following evidence: (1) the receipt by
Apple South's top executives of internal financial reports, and (2) insider
stock sales.8 2 The court determined that the receipt by Apple South's
executives of monthly financial reports that were prepared by Apple
South's financial department and contained detailed information of
material variances in actual versus forecasted results, together with a
list of alleged misstatements, sufficiently established recklessness."
Similarly, the court held that if plaintiffs could show that insider sales
were "unusual" during the class period, a "strong inference" of scienter
would be established.1 '
The evidence showed that three of the
defendants sold a large percentage of their personal holdings in Apple
South (in amounts equal to eighty-two percent, fifty-six percent, and
forty percent of each defendant's holdings), which the court concluded to
be sufficient to establish scienter.' 85
B.

Insider Trading

In Clay v. Riverwood International Corp.,"' the Eleventh Circuit
addressed whether corporate insiders' exercise of stock appreciation

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 1375.
Id. at 1380.
Id. at 1380-81.
Id. at 1381.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
157 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 1998), modified, 176 F.3d 1381 (11th Cir. 1999).
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rights for cash from their employer implicates the insider trading laws
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act")"' and
Rule 10b-5. s8 This was an issue of first impression in the circuits.
This narrow issue arose out of a claim by a purchaser of common stock
in Riverwood International Corporation ("Riverwood") who claimed that
certain executive officers of Riverwood engaged in illegal insider trading
when they exercised stock appreciation rights ("SARs"). The purchaser
claimed that the executive officers acted upon material, nonpublic
information about a proposed leveraged buyout of Riverwood at an
amount less than the then-current market value.18 9
The Eleventh Circuit initially affirmed the district court's finding that
SARs were not securities subject to "disclose or abstain" insider trading
laws. 9 ° Upon rehearing the circuit court modified its prior opinion by
9
adopting the prior concurring opinion of Circuit Judge Carnes.' ' That
opinion held that plaintiff lacked standing to sue under Sections 10(b)
and 20A(a) of the Exchange Act and under Rule 10b-5, thus resolving
the insider trading claim19 2on a much narrower ground than the majority
of the previous opinion.
The concurring opinion found that Congress limited standing to
93
purchasers or sellers of the same class of securities as the insider.'
Plaintiff purchased common stock in Riverwood, which was not the same
class of security as defendants' SARs."' Although Riverwood maintained a reserve of common stock from which to compensate the holders
of SARs, it was only to guarantee payment of the SARs upon their
exercise by defendants.' 95 The concurring opinion gave the following
reasons as further support for its conclusion that the SARs were not of
the same class as common stock: (1) the SARs did not give defendants
any stock voting rights or the opportunity to purchase shares of
Riverwood common stock, (2) the SARs could not be traded on public

187. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(d), 78t-(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
188. 157 F.3d at 1261.
189. Id. at 1262.
190. Id. at 1267.
191. 176 F.3d at 1381.
192. 157 F.3d at 1269-71 (Carnes,J., concurring).
193. Id. at 1270.
194. Id. at 1261. The SARs, which were part of each defendant's executive compensation package, entitled them to payment from Riverwood "equal to the difference between
the SARs' grant value and the fair market value of Riverwood's stock at the time they
exercised them." Id.
195. Id. at 1270.
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exchanges or otherwise transferred through 196
a market, and (3) the SARs
did not affect the market in common stock.
C. Investors Cannot Rely on Equitable Tolling Provisionsof 0. C.G.A.
Section 9-3-96 by Failing to Exercise Reasonable Diligence to Discover
Fraud Before Investing
9 7 the Georgia Court of Appeals refused to
In Fuller v. Dreischarf,'
allow an investor in a nonexistent international company to recover
damages for consideration paid for a security sold in violation of the
Georgia Securities Act of 1973198 because the investor ("plaintiff')
conducted no due diligence whatsoever before making the investment
decision.'9 9 Plaintiff and defendant were neighbors. Defendant
solicited plaintiff to invest $10,000 in a venture called Irish American
Technologies, Ltd. ("IATL"). Defendant subsequently notified plaintiff
that the chairman of IATL vanished with the money. Plaintiff sued to
recover his $10,000.200

First, the court found that plaintiff's right to recover was barred by
the two-year statute of limitations set forth in O.C.G.A. section 10-514(d) for state securities violations.2 °' Plaintiff contended that the
limitations period was tolled by defendant's fraud. Plaintiff pointed to
an investment relationship with defendant in which plaintiff would
invest small amounts of money with a guaranteed return, which usually
materialized. Defendant told plaintiff that IATL manufactured an
antimicrobial hand cream, that the manufacturing facility and technology already existed, that some prototypes
existed, and that defendant had
20 2
personally seen the cream "in action."

The court determined that, in the absence of a confidential relationship, "'[the fraud which tolls a statute of limitation must be such actual
fraud as could not have been discovered by the exercise of ordinary
diligence. '' 211 In this case, the court found that plaintiff failed to
exercise even the most rudimentary due diligence.20 4 In support of its
finding, the court noted that (1) plaintiff accepted everything defendant
told him without inquiring with a licensed broker about the validity of

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
Ga. 203,
204.

Id. at 1271.
238 Ga. App. 18, 517 S.E.2d 89 (1999).
O.C.G.A. §§ 10-5-1 to -24 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
238 Ga. App. at 20, 517 S.E.2d at 91.
Id. at 18, 517 S.E.2d at 90.
Id. at 18-19, 517 S.E.2d at 90.
Id. at 19, 517 S.E.2d at 91.
Id. at 20, 517 S.E.2d at 91 (quoting Bahadori v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 270
205, 507 S.E.2d 467, 470 (1998)).
Id.
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IATL or the investment, (2) plaintiff failed to confirm IATL's ownership
of an alleged patent, (3) plaintiff did not request any prospectus
materials, and (4) plaintiff never received a stock certificate. °5
III.

PARTNERSHIPS

A. Supreme Court Determines That a PartnershipInterest Is a Chose
In Action Under Georgia Law
In Prodigy Centers/Atlanta v. T-C Associates,"6 the Eleventh Circuit
certified to the Georgia Supreme Court the question of whether a
partnership interest in the form of monies owned to a partnership was
a chose in action under Georgia law.2 °7 T-C Associates ("TCA")
obtained a judgment in January 1992 against Prodigy Childhood
Development Centers ("PCDC") but neglected to perfect the judgment
until May 1994. After perfecting the judgment lien, TCA applied for a
court order to garnish PCDC's interests in two limited partnerships to
satisfy the unpaid judgment. Between the time TCA obtained the
judgment against PCDC and the time it perfected the judgment, the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") filed a federal tax lien against PCDC.
After the case was removed to federal court, the IRS moved for summary
judgment, claiming that its tax lien had been filed before TCA had
perfected its judgment and that the partnership interests were a chose
in action 20 to which TCA's judgment could not attach without a
collateral order. TCA filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the
ground that its January 1992 judgment was issued before the federal tax
lien was filed. The district court granted TCA's motion, concluding that
the proceeds payable to PCDC did not represent PCDC's interest in the
partnerships. 0 9
Upon review the Georgia Supreme Court agreed with the IRS's
definition of a chose in action. A chose in action includes "the right of

205. Id.
206. 269 Ga. 522, 501 S.E.2d 209 (1998).
207. 127 F.3d 1021, 1022 (11th Cir. 1997).
208. Georgia law provides that "[a] chose in action is personalty to which the owner has
a right of possession in the future or a right of immediate possession which is being
wrongfully withheld." O.C.G.A. § 44-12-20 (1982). Choses in action are not subject to
seizure and sale under a judgment lien; rather, some other additional collateral proceeding
is necessary to fix the lien of such judgments. Prodigy Ctrs./Atlanta, 269 Ga. at 523 n.3,
501 S.E.2d at 211 n.3 (citing Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Baltimore v. Exchange Bank of
Macon, 100 Ga. 619, 625, 28 S.E. 393, 395 (1897)).
209. 269 Ga. at 522-23, 501 S.E.2d at 210-11.
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a creditor to be paid on a debt owed by a debtor."210 A partnership
interest in a limited partnership is personal property,21' and partners
in a limited partnership have a contractual or statutory right to their
share of monies produced by the limited partnership.2 12 Although
neither the partnership agreements nor the partnership certificates of
formation were in the record, the court reasoned that the mere existence
of the funds owing to PCDC and the limited partnerships' interpleader
action "make it clear that payments have been made by the limited
partnerships as a result of PCDC being a partner in the limited partnerships." 1 ' Thus, the funds sought by TCA were monies to which PCDC
had a statutory or contractual right of possession and "[a]s proceeds from
a contract performance or as a21creditor's
right to be paid, the ...
4
constituted a chose in action."

B.

funds

Covenants Not to Compete

The court of appeals addressed the validity of a noncompete agreement
in the limited partnership context in Russell Daniel Irrigation Co. v.
Coram 5' John Coram worked for Russell Daniel Irrigation Company,
("RDIC") for several years before being offered part ownership in the
company in the form of a limited partnership interest. RDIC required
Coram to sign a limited partnership agreement, that contained a
noncompete provision. RDIC also required Coram and the other limited
partners to sign stand-alone employment agreements containing a
different covenant not to compete." 6 Five years after the execution of
these noncompete agreements, Coram began working for a competitor.
Coram subsequently sued RDIC for monies owed under the partnership
agreement, and RDIC counterclaimed for damages for breach of contract

210. Id. at 524, 501 S.E.2d at 212 (citing Paulsen St. Investors v. EBCO Gen. Agencies,
224 Ga. App. 507, 509, 481 S.E.2d 246, 249 (1997)).
211. Id. at 525, 501 S.E.2d at 212; O.C.G.A. §§ 14-9-701, -9A-49 (1994).
212. 269 Ga. at 526, 501 S.E.2d at 213.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. 237 Ga. App. 758, 516 S.E.2d 804 (1999).
216. The covenant not to compete found in the employment agreement provided as
follows:
"Employee will not, for a period of two (2) years following the termination of
employment, personally engage in any activity which is directly competitive with
any activity engaged in by [RDICI at its Athens, Havana, Tifton location[s] at the
time of his termination. The limitation on directly competitive activities shall
apply only in the following counties: [13 counties listed] and it is expressly
acknowledged and agreed by both parties that the Employee solicited and did
business on behalf of the Employer in each of the above-named counties."
Id. at 760, 516 S.E.2d at 806 (second and third alterations by court).
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based on both noncompete agreements.
The trial court granted
summary judgment to Coram on the counterclaims, and RDIC appealed
the ruling with respect to the enforceability of the noncompete covenant
found in the stand-alone employment agreement.2 17
The court first reviewed the varying degrees of scrutiny that covenants
not to compete receive. "Strict scrutiny applies to covenants ancillary to
employment agreements, whereas a much lesser degree of scrutiny
applies to covenants ancillary to the sale of a business; a middle level of
scrutiny applies to covenants found in professional partnership
agreements."2 18 RDIC claimed that Coram's employment agreement
fell within the middle level of scrutiny because he received valuable
consideration (in the form of a partnership interest) on the same date he
executed the employment agreement. 219
The court rejected this
argument for two reasons.
First, the court noted that the existence of two separate covenants not
to compete warranted the application of two different analytical
standards even though Coram executed both covenants as part of the
same transaction.2 20 A noncompete covenant found in the sale of a
business or purchase of partnership agreements "are generally afforded
greater degrees of latitude" because more valuable consideration is being
offered in exchange for the promise not to compete.221 Moreover, the
value of the partners' profits would be significantly diminished unless
protected by a covenant not to compete.222 When a partnership
requires a partner to enter into a separate employment agreement with
an additional covenant not to compete, "the consideration received for
that covenant is usually less (generally employment benefits such as
salary and insurance coverage), subjecting it to a stricter level of
scrutiny."22 3
Second, the court found that although Coram had worked for RDIC for
nine years and was negotiating for an ownership interest in the
partnership, the circumstances suggested that Coram did not have equal
bargaining power to RDIC or even a professional negotiating a partnership agreement. 224 The court distinguished Coram's situation from

217. Id.
218. Id. at 758-59, 516 S.E.2d at 805 (citing Habif, Arogeti & Wynne, P.C. v. Baggett,
231 Ga. App. 289, 289-91, 498 S.E.2d 346, 349-50 (1998)).
219. Id. at 759, 516 S.E.2d at 805.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id., 516 S.E.2d at 805-06. The court characterized Coram's bargaining power as
that of a "mere employee." Id.
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other cases in which courts applied the middle level of scrutiny to
situations in which, for example, the bargaining power of "professionals
...who either were already partners at the time of negotiation or were
in such demand that they were being recruited to join the partnership
or professional corporation as an owner."22 Being a "mere employee,"
Coram was in a position to be "stigmatized" or singled out as a nonteamplayer if he rejected RDIC's offer."'
Thus, the court applied strict scrutiny to the noncompete covenant
found in the employment agreement. 7 The court found the covenant
to be overbroad and indefinite and, therefore, unenforceable. 228 The
scope of prohibited conduct would effectively prevent Coram "from
obtaining emloyment with any competitor in any capacity," which runs
counter to established case law and the Georgia Constitution. 229 The
court pointed out that only in cases in which the employee is the "heart
and soul" of a business and is "involved in every facet of the business"
may a covenant permissibly prohibit an employee from competing in a
specified area of business. 2 0 Even then the prohibition may only
govern a "very restricted territory and for a short period of time." 3 '
The court also concluded that the covenant was too indefinite as to
duration.3 2
IV. BANKING
A. Jointly Titled Municipal Bond is Not a Contract of Deposit with
FinancialInstitution Under O.C.G.A. Section 7-1-13(a)
In Urban v. Lemley, s3 the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed
whether survivorship rights apply to municipal bonds held in joint bank
accounts. Jessie Beck died in December 1993. Julian Head died in
February 1994. At the time of Beck's death, Beck and Head were joint
owners of a tax-free municipal bond issued by the Macon-Bibb County
Hospital Authority. The bond was titled jointly in Beck's and Head's
names with the right of survivorship. Upon Beck's death, the bond had
not yet matured but was ultimately redeemed after the death of Head

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 760, 516 S.E.2d at 806.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 761, 516 S.E.2d at 806.
Id.
Id.

231. Id.
232.
233.

Id.
232 Ga. App. 259, 501 S.E.2d 529 (1998).
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and Beck. Head's executrix, Lemley, sued Beck's estate, claiming that
Head's estate solely owned the bond. Beck's executrix, Urban, sued
Head's estate, claiming that Beck's estate solely owned the bond. On a
motion for summary judgment, the trial court ruled in favor of Lemley
on the issue of bond ownership.234
The executrix of Beck's estate, Urban, attempted to defeat Head's right
of survivorship with respect to the bond by suggesting that Beck did not
intend for Head to have survivorship rights to the bond. 235 The court
noted, however, that "OCGA § 7-1-813(a) applies only to '[slums
236
remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account.'"
Furthermore, a "joint account" is "'an account payable on request to one
or more of two or more parties, whether or not mention is made of any
right of survivorship.'" 237 Finally, an "account" is "'a contract of
deposit of funds between a depositor and a financial institution and
includes a checking account, savings account, certificate of deposit, share
2 3
account, and other like arrangements.'" 1
Considering that a municipal bond is not a contract of deposit with a
financial institution, but rather is a certificate of indebtedness, the court
reasoned that it does not constitute a "joint account" as that term is
defined in O.C.G.A. section 7-1-813.239 Thus, the court held that the
survivorship rights codified in O.C.G.A. section 7-1-813 do not apply to
municipal bonds held in joint bank accounts.24 °
B.

Legislative Changes

The 1999 session of the Georgia General Assembly passed several
amendments to the Code as it relates to financial institutions,24' the
most notable of which are summarized below.
1. Leasing and Lending Restrictions. The legislature amended
O.C.G.A. section 7-1-282 to make leases of personal property held by a
bank subject to the lending limitations of O.C.G.A. section 7-1-285 and
to provide that such leasing shall constitute indebtedness under that
section.242

234. Id. at 259, 501 S.E.2d at 530.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 262, 501 S.E.2d at 532 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 7-1-813(a) (1997)).
237.
238.

Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 7-1-810(4) (1997)).
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 7-1-810(1) (1997)).

239. Id.
240. Id.
241. O.C.G.A. §§ 7-1-1 to -8-8 (1997 & Supp. 1999).
242. Id. § 7-1-282.
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2. Redemption of Shares by Banks. The legislature amended
O.C.G.A. section 7-1-414 to allow a bank or trust company to acquire
issued shares of its common stock, subject to approval by the state, a
resolution by the board of directors, and approval by two-thirds of the
shares entitled to vote.2" 3
3. Mergers, Conversions, or Consolidations. The legislature
amended O.C.G.A. section 7-1-556 to permit a bank or trust company to
convert into, merge with, or consolidate with a federal savings institution. 244
4. Bank Branches, Offices, Facilities, and Holding Companies. The legislature made significant revisions to O.C.G.A. sections 71-600 to -608 to conform provisions relating to, among other things,
obsolete restrictions on branch offices outside of a county;2 45 to revise
the application process for establishing branch offices; 246 to change
permissible activities of bank holding companies;2 47 and to conform
branching
provisions to federal law and prior changes in Georgia
8
24

law.

5. Interstate Banking. The legislature amended O.C.G.A. section
7-1-621 to liberalize the provisions relating to interstate acquisitions,
mergers, and consolidations.249
V.

AGENCY-APPARENT AUTHORITY

In Augusta Surgical Center, Inc. v. Walton & Heard Office Venture, the Georgia Court of Appeals ruled that a corporation was not
bound by a contract for the purchase of real estate signed by an
individual serving as the corporation's officer.251 On May 5, 1995, R.
Jeffrey Adkins, M.D., executed a sales contract to purchase an office
building for $1,650,000 from sellers, Hamilton and Adams ("Sellers").
At the time of execution, Adkins was Secretary/Treasurer of Augusta

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
-628.6.
250.
251.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 7-1-414(c).
§ 7-1-556(a).
§ 7-1-601.
§ 7-1-602.
§ 7-1-606, -608.
§ 7-1-601.
§§ 7-1-621 to -623, -628, -628.1, -628.3 to

235 Ga. App. 283, 508 S.E.2d 666 (1998).
Id. at 285-87, 508 S.E.2d at 669-70.
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Surgical Center ("Augusta Surgical") and was under contract as the
medical director of Surgicare of Augusta, Inc. ("Surgicare"). Adkins put
down a $5000 personal check as earnest money. Sellers contended that
Adkins acted individually and as agent for Augusta Surgical and
Surgicare. One week after signing the contract, Adkins entered a
substance abuse treatment program, and the Sellers were unable to
locate him as the closing date approached. In the absence of Adkins,
Hamilton negotiated with representatives of Surgicare's parent company
and with officers of Surgicare 2"
No written document provided authorization for Adkins to sign on
behalf of any entity involved in the transaction. When the deal
collapsed, the Sellers sued the purported purchasers, seeking specific
performance or damages for breach of contract. Hamilton claimed that
he and Adkins had been negotiating for months and understood that
Adkins was operating on behalf of other parties. Adkins testified that
he signed the contract only in his individual capacity. Surgicare and
Augusta Surgical
denied granting authority to Adkins to enter into the
253
sales contract.

The court held that the absence of a writing granting Adkins authority
to enter into the sales contract was not dispositive of the issue of his
authority.25 4 "'[While a written instrument may have been executed
by an agent not having any authority in writing to do so or not having
been ratified by an act of comparable dignity, the principal may
nevertheless be estopped by his acts from denying the authority of his
agent.'"255 In other words, if Surgicare or Augusta Surgical ratified
Adkins's actions, it would be prevented from denying Adkins's authority
to act on their behalf.
The Sellers claimed that Surgicare ratified the contract by agreeing on
two occasions to extend the closing date and by deleting a financing
256
term while still attempting to satisfy the extended closing date.
These facts led the court to conclude that factual issues would need to
be resolved by a jury as to whether Surgicare's conduct would have led
a reasonable person to believe that Adkins had acted on Surgicare's
behalf.25 As to Augusta Surgical, the court found that no apparent

252.
253.
254.
255.
(1986))
256.
257.

Id. at 283-84, 508 S.E.2d at 668.
Id. at 285, 508 S.E.2d at 668.
Id. at 286, 508 S.E.2d at 669.
Id. (quoting 20/20 Vision Ctr. v. Hudgens, 256 Ga. 129, 134, 345 S.E.2d 330, 334
(alteration by court).
Id.
Id., 508 S.E.2d at 670.
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authority could be found to bind it to the sales contract. 58 No facts
tied Augusta Surgical to the contract like those that attached Surgicare
to it; in addition, Adkins did not sign the contract as an officer or "on
behalf of' Augusta Surgical, nor did the Sellers offer evidence that
Augusta Surgical clothed Adkins with apparent authority to bind it to
the sales contract." 9 "'The officers [of a corporation] appointed by the
directors are clothed with only such powers and authority as are
expressly conferred upon them by the charter or the by-laws, or as may
by implied by usage and acquiescence."' 260 Thus, the court held that
Augusta Surgical was not liable for the sales contract.26 1
VI.

PROFESSIONAL AssocIATIONs-LABILITY OF SIGNATORIES

In Swiss Bank Corp. v. Thomas, Conner & McDonald, PA.,252 the
Georgia Court of Appeals considered whether members of a professional
corporation organized in Georgia could be held personally liable under
a sublease purportedly entered into by the entity. The day after
defendants formed Thomas, Conner & McDonald, ("Association"), the
Association entered into an agreement with Swiss Bank to sublease
office space. The terms of the sublease and the signature lines all
referred to "Thomas, Conner & McDonald, P.A." However, defendants'
signatures did not indicate that they were signing for the Association.
The trial court denied Swiss Bank's motion for summary judgment,
concluding that defendants were not personally liable for a sublease
agreement entered into by each member of the Association. Swiss Bank
appealed on the ground that defendants had personally participated in
which triggered liability under O.C.G.A. section 14-10the sublease,
63
7(b).

2

The court of appeals affirmed the holding of the trial court, finding
that defendants were acting in a representative capacity when they
signed the sublease, even though none of them denoted that he was

258. Id. at 287, 508 S.E.2d at 670.

259. Id.
260. Id. (quoting Henderson Lumber Co. v. Chatham Bank & Trust Co., 33 Ga. App.
196, 197, 125 S.E. 867, 867 (1924)) (alteration by court).
261. Id.
262. 236 Ga. App. 890, 514 S.E.2d 68 (1999).
263. Id. at 890-91, 514 S.E.2d at 69. That statute provides the following:
[Miembers or shareholders of any professional association organized pursuant to
this chapter shall not be individually liable for the debts of, or claims against, the
professional association unless such member or shareholder has personally
participated in the transaction for which the debt or claim is made or out of which
it arises.
O.C.G.A. § 14-10-7(b) (Supp. 1999).
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The court pointed to the
signing in a representative capacity.26
following facts to support its conclusion: (1) the parties to the agreement
knew the sublease was between plaintiff and the Association, (2) the
sublease expressly stated that the sublease was between plaintiff and
the Association, and (3) even if those parts of the agreement identifying
the Association were vague, because Swiss Bank drafted the agreement,
the agreement would be construed against it.265 Because associations,
like corporations, can only operate by the actions of individuals, the
court reasoned that O.C.G.A. section 14-10-7(b) would be meaningless if
the individual signatories were held liable for every action taken for the
Association. 2"

264.
265.
266.

236 Ga. App. at 892, 514 S.E.2d at 70.
Id.
Id.

